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rendered in a suit of which it had no notice and therefore no
opportunity to defend grates against the ingrained principle
that every man shall have his day in court.2 5 It is unfortunate
that the court in the instant case did not refer to the West rule
that liability under the Direct Action Statute is fixed at the time
of injury and expressly impose a limitation upon it. The decision should be so interpreted; and, as interpreted, the noted
decision preserves the Louisiana policy of protecting the in-

jured party except when that policy conflicts with the defendant insurer's fundamental right to a judicial hearing.2 6 Thus

the accident-suit distinction appears justifiable and desirable;
it supports the Hallman decision and reconciles the Hallman and
West cases.

27
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-

THE

EFFECT OF R.S.

13:4985 ON

PARTITIONS

MADE WITHOUT REPRESENTATION OF ALL CO-OWNERS

"No one can be compelled to hold property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has the right
to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action
of partition."' The Code characterizes partition as a "sort of
exchange" by which one's right in part of a thing is exchanged
2
for others' rights in the remainder which becomes his alone.
and investigation conducted by injured party's counsel normally furnish necessary
details of accident).
25. For recent statements of this ancient heritage see United States ea7 rel.
TVA v. McCoy, 198 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. N.C. 1961); Baltz v. The Fair, 178
F. Supp. 691 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ; Beck v. Jarret, 363 P.2d 215 (1961) ; O'Niel v.
Dux, 101 N.W.2d 588 (1960).
26. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (persons not parties to personam
actions are not bound by the judgment therein, and enforcement of the judgment
against such persons violates the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments).
27. By the combined decisions of West and Hallman, important qualifications
have been read into R.S. 22:655 (Direct Action Statute). Can it be assumed
that the Hallman rule will also apply to R.S. 32:900(F) (1) (Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act)? It has been held that a "motor vehicle liability
policy" as defined in the latter act is not the same as a general liability policy
under the former act. New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.
La. 1954). Would this case be authority for not applying the Hallman decision
to cases falling under R.S. 32:900?
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1289 (1870).
2. Id. art. 1382. However, all exchanges which terminate ownership of property in indivision are not necessarily partitions. Goodwin v. Chesneau's Heirs, 3
Mart.(N.S.) 409 (La. 1825). A sale by one heir to his coheir definitely terminates the ownership in indivision, but this would be treated as a sale rather than
as a partition.

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1405 (1870).
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NOTES

Every partition is either in kind or by licitation, definitive or
provisional, voluntary or judicial. Partition is in kind when
property is physically divided among the co-owners ;3 it is by

licitation when property is sold and the proceeds are distributed
among the co-owners. 4 A definitive partition is one which is
permanent and irrevocable; a provisional partition is one which
is made of certain things before the remainder can be divided

or when it is impossible to partition permanently. 5 A provisional partition permits parties to enjoy the fruits of the partitioned
things. 6 Voluntary partitions are those accomplished among the

co-owners by their mutual consent; judicial partitions are those
made by the courts according to the formalities prescribed by
law. 7 If all the co-owners are of age and present, the partition
may be voluntary ;8 however, if any co-owner is an absentee,

minor, or interdict, the partition must be made judicially.9 One
co-owner, however, can sell his undivided interest to either an
outsider' 0 or one of his co-owners 1" without such sale being considered a partition.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1337 (1870) : "Each of the co-heirs may demand in
Partition
kind his share of the movables and immovables of the succession .......
in kind is favored by the law, and in judicial partitions the judge must order a
partition in kind unless the property is indivisible or its division would cause a
diminution of its value. Aucoin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1339 (1870). A partition by licitation may be made
just as any other partition where all co-owners are of age and are present or represented. In all other cases the partition must be made judicially and the courts
are reluctant to grant partitions by licitation. E.g., Pryor v. Desha, 204 La. 575,
15 So. 2d 891 (1943) ; Aucoin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1295 (1870). A judicial partition in which the time
for appeal has passed is a definitive partition, since it is permanent and irrevocable. Article 1296 provides: "By definitive partition is also understood the judi... On the other hand any partition that is not made according
cial partition.
to the formalities prescribed by law is only provisional. Thus a voluntary partition among all the co-owners where one co-owner was a minor is provisional because the law requires partitions where a minor is involved to be made judicially.
If the minor, upon reaching his majority, ratifies the partition it then ceases to
be provisional and becomes a definitive partition. See Rhodes v. Cooper, 113 La.
600, 37 So. 527 (1904).
6. Rhodes v. Cooper, 118 La. 299, 42 So. 943 (1907).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1294 (1870).
8. Id. art. 1322.
9. Id. art. 1323. Articles 1324 to 1346 prescribe the form for a judicial partition- inventory, appraisal, collation, parties, procedure, and the granting of
partitions by licitation.
10. In Carway v. Hebert, 182 So. 164, 167 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938) the court
said that a co-owner may sell his interest in the whole or in only a part of the
entire thing held in common, as long as "be sells that interest subject to the rights
of the other co-owners, whose rights came into existence when the thing was
acquired in common ownership."
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1405 (1870) provides that sale by one heir to his coheir is not subject to rescission if the vendor remains bound for the payment of
debts.
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The Louisiana courts have consistently held a partition in
which all of the co-owners are not represented to be absolutely
null and with no effect on any party to the partition. 12 Thus
any co-owner, even a party to the partition, could have it set
aside upon proving that some other person with an interest in
the property had not been a party to the partition. 8 This rule
undermined the stability of land titles in Louisiana. The courts
have continually held that since the partition is null, any sale
made under it is null and "the purchaser at such a sale is not
protected by the decree for a partition.'

14

In an obvious attempt to remedy this situation, while at the
same time protecting the rights of the unrepresented co-owner,
the legislature passed Act 403 of 1952, which provided:
"Where real property is partitioned, either in kind or by
licitation, by either judicial or conventional partition the
fact that one or more co-owners are not parties thereto shall
not affect the validity of such partition as to the co-owners
who are parties thereto or their heirs or assigns; provided
that the rights of any co-owner not a party to such partition
shall not be affected thereby and the interest of such coowner in the property partitioned shall remain the same as
if the property had not been partitioned."' 5
12. Sun Oil Co. v. Smith, 216 La. 27, 43 So. 2d 148 (1949) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940) ; Erskine v. Gardiner, 162
La. 83, 110 So. 97 (1926) ; Latham v. Glasscock, 160 La. 1089, 108 So. 100
(1926) ; Wheeler v. Mann, 149 La. 866, 90 So. 225 (1921) ; Smith v. Smith, 131
La. 970, 60 So. 634 (1913); Boutte v. Executors of Boutte, 30 La. Ann. 177
(1878) ; Wright & Williams v. Cane, 18 La. Ann. 579 (1866) ; Rightor v. DeLizardi, 4 La. Ann. 260 (1849) ; Kendrick's Heirs v. Kendrick, 19 La. 36 (1841) ;
Guidry v. Guidry's Heirs, 16 La. 157 (1840). In the Sun Oil case the court said:
"It is well settled under the jurisprudence of this state that a partition is invalid if all of the co-owners of the property partitioned are not made parties
thereto, whether the partition is by conventional agreement or by judicial process,
and that such a purported partition is considered as no partition at all, binds
none of the parties to it and is null as to all." Sun Oil Co. v. Smith, 216 La. 27,
39, 43 So. 2d 148, 152 (1949).
On the same question, the court in Wheeler v. Mann, 149 La. 866, 879, 90
So. 225, 229 (1921) said: "It is clear, then, that there is no question here presented of the right to rescind a partition, or of the prescription of an action having that purpose in view, since there has been no partition."
13. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1412 (1870) : "[F]or the partition cannot subsist
for one and be annulled for another."
14. Latham v. Glasscock, 160 La. 1089, 1097, 108 So. 100, 102 (1926). See
also Johnston v. Burton, 202 La. 152, 11 So. 2d 513 (1942) ; Scaife v. Jones, 156
La. 5, 99 So. 890 (1924) ; Succession of Poree, 27 La. Ann. 463 (1875) ; Martin
v. Carroll, 59 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952).
15. LA. R.S. 13:4985 (1950).

19631

NOTES

The act is retroactive 1 6 and effective 17against all parties including interdicts, minors, and absentees.
However, in a recent case which seemed to fall squarely within the statute, it was neither cited nor applied. The plaintiffs
in Lang v. Forneals were seeking to set aside a partition among
their deceased mother and her brothers, some of whom were minors at the time and not parties to the partition. In upholding
the plaintiff's contention that the partition was null, the court
of appeal based its decision on the jurisprudential principle that
a partition binds none of the co-owners if all were not parties to
the partition. 9 It is submitted that the court erred in not applying the statute in this case. Possibly the court overlooked the
statute as it was neither mentioned in the opinion nor urged in
the briefs. Application of the statute in Lang would have sustained the partition since the unrepresented
co-owner was not
20
the party challenging the partition.
Louisiana courts recently took cognizance of the statute for
the first time. In Lewis v. Bell, 2' plaintiffs were seeking to annul a prior judgment ordering a partition sale on grounds that
it would be unconscionable and inequitable because certain owners were not parties to the prior suit. All plaintiffs in Lewis
had been parties to the earlier suit ordering the sale. In rebutting their contention, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, said:
"[0]ur law does not require that all co-owners be joined in
order to make the partition by licitation binding on those
16. Id. 13:4986. To insure constitutionality, co-owners are given a period of
six months from the effective date of the act to set aside a previous partition
where all co-owners were not parties thereto.
17. Id. 13:4988: "The provisions of R.S. 13:4985 through 13:4990 shall be
effective as to all parties including absentees, minors, and interdicts." The legislature was evidently trying to stabilize land titles when it passed this act. The
title of the Act states that it is: "An Act to provide that where real property is
partitioned the validity of the partition shall not be affected by the fact that one
or more co-owners were not parties thereto . ...
18. 135 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
19. See cases cited at note 12 8upra.
20. Therefore the partition in Lang should have been upheld unless it was
subject to attack on the grounds for rescission of any contract, e.g., error, mistake, or fraud. Prior to R.S. 13:4985 the court said that there was no question
of rescission involved since there had been no partition. See note 12 supra. It
would seem that since the act makes these partitions valid (at least among the
* parties) they would be subject to the actions for rescission. For example, in
Lang the partition was made in the form of reciprocal acts of sale. In the sale
from defendants to plaintiffs' mother, it was agreed that the minors would, upon
reaching their majority, transfer their interest in the property transferred to
plaintiffs' mother to her. The opinion of the court does not show whether this
was ever done. If it were not, there might be grounds for rescission on the basis
of failure of cause.
21. 137 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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co-owners who are parties to the suit....
To hold that
where co-owners are not joined the judgement is subject to
attack under Code of Practice Article 607 because it is unconscionable and inequitable, would be holding that R.S.
'22
13:4985 does not have any effect.
Therefore, the statute has at least changed the rights of coowners who were parties to the partition; they can no longer
attack its validity. The courts, however, have not interpreted
the statute with respect to the rights of a co-owner not a party
to the partition. The proviso "the interests of such co-owner...
shall remain the same as if the property had not been partitioned ' 23 is subject to at least two interpretations. It could mean
that the rights of the non-party co-owner remain the same as
they were under the jurisprudence prior to the statute. Thus he
could still have the partition declared null. However, such interpretation would not stabilize land titles. The statute would only
limit the persons who could attack the partition.
It would seem more logical and desirable to interpret the statute as upholding the validity of the partition even from attack
by a co-owner who was not a party thereto. The proviso then
protects the non-party co-owner by preserving his interest in
the whole property despite the partition. Under this interpretation any division or sale of the property under or subsequent to
the partition would be valid except to the extent of the non24
party co-owner's interest.
It is submitted that the court should adopt the latter interpretation because of the desired stabilization of land titles. In
any event the partition is obviously no longer to be considered
absolutely null; only the unrepresented co-owner can attack it.
The validity of the partition is unimpeachable by those who
2
participate in it. 5
Richard B. Sadler III
22. Id. at 708.
23. LA. R.S. 13:4985 (1950).
24. Thus he would hold his proportionate interest in indivision with the holder
of each separate piece of the partitioned property. For example, if one of ten
co-owners was unrepresented, and the property was divided into nine equal lots,
he would then own a 1/10 interest in each of the lots. Under this interpretation
a third party purchasing from one of the parties to the partition would be protected as he would have valid title to 9/10 of the property he purchased, whereas
prior to the statute he would have had nothing except his warranty action.
25. Another problem posed by the statute is that of prescription. Under the
jurisprudence in cases in which there was an unrepresented co-owner, the courts
have held that a partition deed is merely declaratory and not translative of title

